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Extract from Report of Operations for the Quarter Ended 30 June 1951.

BGFIEND

1. Approved on 22 June 1949, this Project was originally conceived to have as its minimum objective the reduction of Albanian capabilities for supporting guerrilla activities in the Greek civil war, and as its maximum objective, the overthrow of the Hoxha regime. On 6 September 1949, it was agreed that the maximum objective should be temporarily abandoned. The purpose of the Project as it now stands is the maintenance of popular resistance through covert media, the development of NCFA political strength and OPC underground nets inside Albania in order to be able to exploit effectively any large-scale resistance movement against the Hoxha regime. The necessary assets for clandestine wartime operations in Albania are also to be established in the event of a Soviet-Satellite aggression in the Balkans. Due to the complexity of international factors involved, the maximum cold-war objective of the Project is under continuous review.

2. This is a direct OPC undertaking, whose program comprises subversive paramilitary, PW-propaganda, political, economic warfare and support operations. Policy is coordinated with the British Services, but operations are determined and conducted independently.

3. During the second quarter of 1951, the following progress was made in each program category:

a. Subversive-paramilitary operations

Recent letters from the survivors of the original three teams sent into Albania in November 1950 indicate that all of the "Kukes" team are still operating on the Albanian-Yugoslav border.

On May 18/19, following a series of unsuccessful tries due to adverse weather conditions, a two-man resupply team was dropped in the area of Kukes, and it is hoped that these reinforcements will be able to contact the original team. One of the members of the Dibra team also remains in letter contact with the NCFA via Yugoslavia, but he reports that the team is widely scattered and that he remains the sole operative.

The letters received to date indicate a positive reaction on the part of the Albanian people toward the NCFA, confirming other reports that NCFA propaganda has had a favorable effect on the morale of the Albanian people.

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The agents report considerable good will towards themselves in their contacts with the local population, as well as a willingness to provide recruits. In this connection, the NCFA received in May an offer from an Albanian Army Captain to defect with 60 of his men to join the "forces of the NCFA," but the Captain has been encouraged to remain in the country where his services may be of greater ultimate value. The reporting agents participated in the spring disorders which evoked counteraction by Pursuit Brigades led by Mehmet Shehu, Minister of the Interior.

A fifth and final attempt was made on the night of June 6/7 to contact the two-man resupply team infiltrated on 18/19 May by ground-air radio failed. No further attempts are scheduled, inasmuch as there was only slight hope that the Motorolas being used by the team would prove successful as a means of communication. New infiltrees are to be given URC-4's for ground-air communication, and W/T transmissions will be possible as soon as the operators now in training are infiltrated late in the summer (September).

On 18/19 June, the first effort to resupply this two-man team failed because of an inability to establish contact through prearranged signals. On the following night, a second attempt was made and also failed due to an improper ground fire pattern, which was probably set out incorrectly by the team. Another attempt is scheduled for July.

The OPC covert aircraft was again used on 23 June to infiltrate seven OSO agents into the Peqin area.

b. PW and Propaganda Activities

In conformity with the State Department ban on leaflet drops over Albania early in the second quarter of 1951, no such operations were undertaken. However, during the resupply mission of 18/19 May and again during the body drop on the night of 23 June, permission was granted to drop several thousand leaflets on each occasion as a deceptive measure. Some of the leaflets which had been specially executed following the bombing of the Soviet Legation in Tirana in February were included in the deceptive drops. A cartoon leaflet labeled "Our Government Holds a Meeting" was completed in June and sent to Athens. In view of the large number of leaflets waiting in Athens to be dropped (2,500,000) after the ban has been lifted, additional final texts have not been sent to Washington for processing, but the [] is continuing to

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produce material for future use. The two man resupply team sent in on 18/19 May was provided with propaganda material to be mailed inside the country.

Due to technical difficulties, the BGFIEND Radio Vessel did not go into operation in June as originally planned. It is hoped, however, that in July regular clandestine broadcasts in Albania can be initiated successfully.

The National Committee for a Free Albania has continued to issue its newspaper Shqiperia on a fortnightly basis as scheduled. Five thousand copies of the newspaper have been printed in small format and are being sent to the field with the manner of distribution as yet undecided. The format and substance of the Albanian newspaper are being studied with a view to its marked improvement.

The BGFIEND [] are closely cooperating with Radio Free Europe, which began its Albanian broadcasts on 1 June 1951. Arrangements have been made for the continuous exchange of information between RFE and the OPC []

c. Political Activity

On 24 May 1951, the Executive Council of the NCFA was presented with an NCFE aide-memoire, drawn up in accordance with the views of EE-1 Headquarters stressing the necessity for broadening the Committee to achieve a more representative character. Although the three members of the Council presently in New York (Mr. Hasan Dosti, Mr. Said Kryeziu, and Mr. Nuci Kotta) expressed complete agreement with the aide-memoire in principle; the Committee Chairman, Mr. Dosti of the Balli Kombetar, asked for a delay in which to consult his party in Rome. The meeting scheduled for 15 June to vote on the issue was subsequently postponed in order to permit further consultation between EE-1, its field representatives, and the British Services regarding the composition of the enlarged Committee. A brief tour has been arranged for Mr. Kryeziu, whose current trip to the U.S. was apparently made in order to add lustre to his personal prestige among the refugees, and for Mr. Kotta. Hasan Dosti's suggestion that Abas Kupi and Zef Pali be invited to the U.S. to participate in the vote on broadening the Committee is under consideration. Former King Zog has planned a "non-political" trip to the U.S. in July, reportedly to establish permanent residence in the United States.

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The formation of a Yugoslav-sponsored League of Albanian Refugees in Prizren early in May represents a serious potential threat to the NCFA and is under close surveillance. The League is reported to have between three to five thousand refugees organized into militant groups, and a recent report claims that it has up to 100 active agents in Albania. Preliminary steps have been taken to parry the threat. The NCFA has been instructed to adopt an attitude of scepticism towards the Prizren Proclamation calling for a "Free, Independent and Republican Albania," without launching into an exchange of polemics with the Yugoslav League. The feasibility of a meeting at Trieste between Abaz Kupi and Nik Sokoli, a leader of the Yugoslav-sponsored League (at which EE-1 would be represented in the background) is under consideration, primarily with a view to obtaining some light on the intentions of the League and possibly to lay the groundwork for a limited form of cooperation. Although such cooperation with the Yugoslav-sponsored group would offer certain obvious advantages, the inherent opportunities for ultimate Yugoslav domination of the liberation movement necessitate extreme care in approaching the problem. At OPC's request, the State Department has instructed Ambassador Allen in Belgrade to point out to the Yugoslavs the inconsistency between the Government's alleged concern over the Soviet reaction to subversion of Albania and its own activities in that respect. It is anticipated that the Yugoslavs, without attempting the overthrow of the Hoxha regime for the present, will continue their organizational, subversive and espionage activities in Albania as a counterforce to NCFA successes. The preponderance of potential and tangible assets available to the Yugoslav Government indicates the need for continued strengthening of the NCFA with BGFIEND support.

d. Economic Warfare Operations

Interference with the transiting of goods between the Central European Satellites and Albania is still largely dependent on the establishment of an OPC

e. Support Operations

(1) Training and Recruitment

During the month of April, the CIA field assessment team screened over 200 men in the Albanian Guard

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Company in Germany and selected 66 individuals judged best qualified for agent infiltration. In May the assessment team paid a visit to the IRO Lavrion Camp in Greece, where it selected 63 prospects for operational training. Also during May a list of candidates for the next training class was approved by the National Committee for Free Albania, but training was delayed because of the presence of Bulgarian trainees in the center. Since 11 June, 16 Albanians have been undergoing guerrilla warfare training in the BGFIEND covert school in Germany. Following completion of the training, which is scheduled for about 12 July, these agents will be moved to Greece. Fourteen Albanians are currently undergoing W/T training for operations in the late summer.

(2) Assignment of Personnel

A number of personnel are in training and process for immediate assignment overseas. Their addition to the BGFIEND staff, which was augmented in June to strengthen the BGFIEND Broadcasting Vessel staff and the training staff of the covert school in Germany, will virtually complete the BGFIEND Table of Organization.

(3) Facilities and Installations

With the acquisition on 3 April of a new training center in Germany as an addition to the Hambuechen Estate, EE-1 training facilities have been considerably improved. The training center has been placed under the administrative control of EE-3. Albanian and Bulgarian training classes must alternate in using the available facilities, but it is considered that these are adequate for BGFIEND purposes. Some consideration has been given to moving the BGFIEND training center to Greece, but as yet no decision has been made.

The BGFIEND Radio Broadcasting Vessel, Juanita, was forced to delay trial operations until mid-May largely as a result of damages incurred during the trans-Atlantic crossing. After fifteen days of test cruising in the Ionian sea, it was decided by the to suspend operations until a number of technical difficulties could be overcome and a system of operation evolved during

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the visit to Athens of [] and []
late in June.

(4) Agreements with Friendly Powers

In April, a general plan for the infiltration of Albanians over the Greek border was agreed upon by British, Greek and OPC representatives in Athens.

During [] recent stay in London, he discussed with the British Services on an exploratory basis the entire Albanian situation and in particular the question of broadening the Albanian National Committee. These conversations will be renewed on his return visit from the Eastern Mediterranean in the hope that early agreement regarding our future joint policy on Albania will be reached.

(5) Coordination

On 7 April a meeting of key BGFIEND field officers in Germany was called by the Branch Chief to explore avenues of action regarding Albania during the coming months. It was decided to extend considerably the original plan for the infiltration of eight to ten four-man teams plus several smaller teams for special tasks.

A conference of BGFIEND personnel was held in Athens on 7-8 May to review the present status of activities between the Rome and Athens stations.

[] together with [] undertook in June an extensive field survey trip with the aim of discussing policies and the 1951 operation schedule with our representatives in the field and to improve further coordination between Headquarters and the Field Stations. BGFIEND activities comprised an important aspect of [] agenda.

During the period, EE-I Headquarters strengthened its coordination with the NCFE with respect to the latter's direction of the National Committee for a Free Albania through a number of visits to New York by Headquarters personnel. The necessary prerequisite that Headquarters guidance for the NCFE must be dependent on close policy coordination with both the Department of State and the British Services represents

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a serious difficulty in establishing smooth and rapid coordination between Washington and the NCFE. Establishment of the NCFE Washington office in June has already resulted in some improvement in controlling the NCFE's understandable impatience.

(6) Planning

A study on the implications of Yugoslav maneuvers in Albania with respect to our own policies was prepared in June by the Branch Plans Section to serve as a basis for a current evaluation of Yugoslav intentions toward the Hoxha Government and the NCFA.

An exchange of views took place in June between the State Department and EE-I regarding the possibility that an UNSCOB investigation of subversive operations against Albania from Greece might cause embarrassment to both the U.S. and Greek Governments. Although a growing interest in such activities on the part of certain members of the UNSCOB team in Greece constitutes a real danger to OPC operations, it is the opinion of [redacted] that the situation is not yet critical. The State Department has been asked, however, to block any serious investigation and to consider the possibility of discontinuing UNSCOB.

A detailed study on the nature, functions, and control mechanism of the National Committees, with specific reference to the Albanian National Committee, was completed during the period and is now serving as a guide with respect to Committee matters.

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BGSPEED

1. This is a subproject under BGFIEND and calls for the purchase, equipping and operation of a vessel to be used for radio broadcasting beamed at Albania.

2. This is a direct CPC undertaking, whose program comprises the preparation, editorial processing, and transmitting of black propaganda to Albania.

3. As indicated under BGFIEND, the BGSPEED vessel has been forced to delay operations until further trial runs are conducted and a number of technical difficulties are eliminated. It is still hoped that the vessel can begin regular broadcasts in July.

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